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Abstract
Human cooperative behaviour, as assayed by decisions in experimental economic dilemmas such as the Dictator Game, is
variable across human populations. Within-population variation has been less well studied, especially within industrial
societies. Moreover, little is known about the extent to which community-level variation in Dictator Game behaviour relates
to community-level variation in real-world social behaviour. We chose two neighbourhoods of the city of Newcastle upon
Tyne that were similar in most regards, but at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of level of socioeconomic deprivation.
We administered Dictator Games to randomly-selected residents, and also gathered a large number of more naturalistic
measures of cooperativeness. There were dramatic differences in Dictator Game behaviour between the two
neighbourhoods, with the mean allocation to the other player close to half the stake in the affluent neighbourhood,
and close to one tenth of the stake in the deprived neighbourhood. Moreover, the deprived neighbourhood was also
characterised by lower self-reported social capital, higher frequencies of crime and antisocial behaviour, a higher frequency
of littering, and less willingness to take part in a survey or return a lost letter. On the other hand, there were no differences
between the neighbourhoods in terms of the probability of helping a person who dropped an object, needed directions to
a hospital, or needed to make change for a coin, and people on the streets were less likely to be alone in the deprived
neighbourhood than the affluent one. We conclude that there can be dramatic local differences in cooperative behaviour
within the same city, and that these need further theoretical explanation.
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Introduction
A striking finding of recent research on human cooperation is
that its expression is highly variable. This has been shown most
clearly by studies using experimental economic dilemmas, such as
the Dictator Game (DG), across several societies [1,2,3,4,5]. In the
DG, a participant has to divide a sum of money any way he wishes
between himself and an anonymous stranger, thus providing a
simple behavioural measure of generosity to others [6]. In the
industrialised populations which have been studied, most partic-
ipants allocate something to the other party, with a mean
allocation between one third and one half of the stake [7]. In
smaller-scale societies, though, the mean allocation is significantly
lower [2,5]. There have been rather fewer studies of within-
population local variation, and those which have been carried out
(e.g. [8,9]) have mostly focussed on nonindustrial societies. Indeed,
one can encounter the claim in the literature that there is not
much within-population variation in pro-social behaviour to be
found within industrialised nations ([8], p. 604). This conclusion
may stem from reliance on relatively homogenous, affluent,
university-related samples. Such reliance is typical of behavioural
science more generally [10,11]. However, contemporary Western
cities may have neighbourhoods away from universities where
cooperative behaviour is very different from how it is on campuses.
There are several reasons for believing this might be the case.
Falk and Zehnder [12] used an experimental economic dilemma
to show that participants from certain neighbourhoods of Zurich
were trusted significantly less, and behaved in a significantly less
trustworthy way, than participants from other neighbourhoods.
Wilson et al. [13] used self-report measures of prosociality in a
sample of young people from Binghamton, NY, and showed that
the substantial variation in prosociality was spatially patterned,
with detectable low- and high-prosociality areas. More generally,
the survey-based sociological literature has revealed significant
intra-population variation in social capital, which is usually
defined as the social networks and norms that facilitate effective
collective action [14,15,16]. Moreover, social psychologists have
studied cooperation using field-experimental techniques, and
observed significant heterogeneity, for example between different
cities within the USA [17].
In this study, then, we sought to investigate the extent of
neighbourhood differences in cooperative behaviour within one
English city. England is a small but economically highly unequal
country characterised by quite dramatic differences in vital
prospects [18] and life-history parameters [19] between people
of different socioeconomic positions. In cities, people are highly
spatially assorted by socioeconomic position, and neighbourhoods
can be classified on a continuum from deprived to affluent, using
widely available indices. The literature would allow us to make
predictions in either direction concerning differences in cooper-
ation between affluent and deprived neighbourhoods. On the one
hand, it is economically deprived communities who experience
low perceived neighbourhood quality [13], high crime [15,20], low
social capital and trust [14,15,21], and low rates of civic
participation [14]. These would suggest low levels of spontaneous
cooperation in these areas. In the Zurich study, it was poor
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neighbourhoods which were characterised by low trust/trustwor-
thiness in an experimental economic dilemma [12]. On the other
hand, a recent US study showed that individuals of lower
socioeconomic position were actually more generous in a DG
and related measures of generosity than those of higher
socioeconomic position [22]. The authors argued that people
living under economic hardship are more dependent on one
another for the achievement of their life goals, and hence develop
greater concern for the outcomes of others, egalitarianism, and
empathy (see also [23]). This literature would therefore suggest
that we might find more willingness to cooperate with others in
deprived than affluent neighbourhoods.
The main study reported here used two neighbourhoods about
6 kms apart, closely matched in key respects but differing sharply
in the level of economic deprivation (see methods and Appendix
S1 for background). The study had three goals. The first was to
test whether there were significant differences between the two
neighbourhoods in cooperative behaviour as assessed by the DG,
and if so, in which direction, given the contrary predictions
outlined above. The second goal was explore the robustness of the
DG paradigm as a measure of cooperativeness. Repeated concerns
have been expressed regarding whether the generosity observed in
the DG stems from participants knowing that they are taking part
in an experiment [24,25,26]. To mitigate this problem, we
administered our DGs relatively surreptitiously, by inviting
participants to take part in a social survey in their homes, for
which they would receive £10 as a thank you. At the end of the
survey, we asked them to indicate if they would like all of the £10
for themselves, or would prefer to have some it allocated to
another party. This differs somewhat from the standard DG
administration, but it recreates the essential DG dilemma without
the participant necessarily being aware that their decision is itself a
study variable. Another limitation of the DG is that the situation of
having to share a resource with another person without knowing
the identity of that person is presumably rare or nonexistent in real
life. Gurven and Winking [27] have suggested that more insight
into real-world cooperativeness might be gained with more
ecologically realistic scenarios where the other party is not
anonymous. Thus, as well as an anonymous DG (which we here
term the ‘Unknown’ condition, since the identity of the recipient is
unknown), we also used variants where the other party is a friend
nominated by the participant (the ‘Friend’ condition), and where
the beneficiary is a known good cause (the ‘Charity’ condition). If
we still observe generosity in the DG despite the surreptitious
administration, and if the patterns of allocation are similar
whether the other party is unknown or is a friend, this will tend
to support the robustness of the conventional DG as a behavioural
measure of generosity.
The third goal of our main study was to validate the DG results
against other measures of cooperation, including more naturalistic
ones. Although we know that DG behaviour differs across human
populations, we know relatively little about whether or how those
differences are reflected in actual cooperation with others outside
of the experimental situation. Studies which have tried to relate
individual behaviour in experimental dilemmas to cooperativeness
measured other ways have found correlations to be either absent
or weak [27,28,29,30]. The only study we are aware of which seeks
to validate experimental dilemmas against more naturalistic
measures of social cooperation at the community level is that of
Lamba and Mace [9], who showed a weak positive correlation
across villages between play in a public goods game, and social
distribution of valued salt resources. To investigate the extent to
which any neighbourhood DG differences mirror neighbourhood
differences in cooperative behaviour more generally, we employed
a range of other measures inspired by different traditions of
research on social behaviour, such as those of sociology [14,15],
and social and environmental psychology [17,31]. We used a self-
report survey measuring social capital. Social capital has been the
subject of extensive attention from sociologists, and is believed to
be a key prerequisite for cooperative social action. The survey was
administered to the same individuals as the DG, and if the DG is
valid measure of cooperativeness, we might expect a positive
relationship between DG allocations and social capital, at either
the individual or neighbourhood level, or both. We also gathered
naturalistic observations of cooperation-relevant behaviours in the
neighbourhood: the number of crimes and antisocial behaviour
incidents reported to the police over a four-month period, the
frequency of dropping litter, the frequency of police patrols, and
the mean group size of adults observed in the streets. Finally, we
performed a series of field experiments to see if cooperation could be
elicited more readily from strangers in one neighbourhood than in
the other. The rate of response to our survey was one such
measure. In addition, we measured the return rate of lost letters
left on the pavement, the rate of spontaneous assistance when a
researcher drops an object in the street, and the likelihood of help
when a researcher asks a passerby to make change for a coin or
give directions. One possibility is that all of the different measures
will produce neighbourhood differences in the same direction as
any difference seen in the DG. This would be a useful validation of
DG methods as assays of cooperativeness at the community level,
and also suggest that the many different traditions of research on
cooperativeness (e.g. the social capital literature and the
experimental economic dilemmas literature) are all measuring
related underlying parameters. However, we are also open to the
possibility that the different measures might produce different
results. For example, field experiments similar to ours have
previously been performed in 36 different US cities, with the
finding that high cooperation on one measure, at the city level,
does not predict high cooperation on all the others [17]. This
suggests that cooperativeness, as a property of social groups, has
multiple dissociable components. It is plausible, given the mutually
contradictory predictions arising from previous literature, that our
more deprived neighbourhood will be less cooperative than the
affluent one on some measures and more on others.
The methods used in our main study are highly time-intensive,
given that they involve behavioural observation and field
experimentation as well as recruitment of experimental subjects.
Thus, we have only been able to focus on two neighbourhoods,
making it impossible to establish whether any differences we find
are limited to our two study sites or part of a broader pattern of
variation. To partially address this, in Appendix S2, we
additionally present an ancillary study which used just a self-
report survey, but recruited more broadly from 8 neighbourhoods
within the same conurbation.
Methods
Owing to the large number of methods used, we here provide
only summary information, referring the reader to Appendix S1
for further details.
Ethics statement
All components of this study were approved by the Faculty of
Medical Sciences ethics committee at Newcastle University.
Participants in the DG and self-report survey gave written consent
to participate and for their anonymized data to be included in the
analysis. For the naturalistic observations and field experiments,
informed consent was not possible due to the nature of the study,
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and this requirement was waived by the ethics committee.
However, all participants were in public spaces where they would
have expected their behaviour to be visible to others, and no
personally identifying information was recorded.
Choice of study neighbourhoods
The two study neighbourhoods (A and B) have already been the
site of ongoing behavioural research [32,33]. They were carefully
selected using the 2001 UK census and local piloting, to form a
matched pair, similar in terms of physical layout, distance from the
city centre, population size, density, and ethnic composition, but
extremely divergent in terms of socioeconomic deprivation (see
table 1). Neighbourhood A is in the 79th percentile of all English
neighbourhoods for socioeconomic deprivation (i.e. amongst the
22% most affluent), and neighbourhood B is in the 1st percentile of
deprivation (i.e. more deprived than over 99% of all English
census areas). Individual-level characteristics of the residents, such
as education and income, differ accordingly. For more information
on the ethnographic background of the neighbourhoods, see
Appendix S1.
Dictator Games
We randomly selected names and addresses of adults within the
two neighbourhoods and posted a pack containing an explanatory
letter and the self-report survey, along with a prepaid return
envelope, through their doors (n = 170 in neighbourhood A, 230 in
neighbourhood B). The survey itself is described below. The
Dictator Game was surreptitiously administered on completion of
the survey. The explanatory letter offered £10 in cash for survey
completion, and an enclosed payment form asked the respondent
to specify whether they would like the entire £10 to be delivered
through their door, or would prefer to allocate any or all of it to
another party (amounts in whole pounds only). Respondents were
randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In the Unknown
condition, the other party was described as a ‘randomly-chosen
person from your local neighbourhood’. In the Friend condition,
the participant was given a box in which to give the details of
anyone they wished from the Tyneside area as the recipient, as
long as that person lived at a different address. As we wished to
make cooperation attractive in this condition, we doubled the
monies allocated, so that by allocating all £10, the respondent
could have their nominated friend receive £20. In the Charity
condition, the recipient was specified as a locally well-known
charitable foundation which provides free air ambulance services
throughout the North of England. Again, allocations in this
condition were doubled. All monies were delivered as promised,
either in cash within one week with an accompanying letter to the
person’s house, or at the end of the study in the case of the charity
donation.
Self-report survey
The self-report survey participants filled in prior to the
surreptitious DG contained basic demographic information, plus
six questions probing social capital. These asked how much the
respondent trusted people in the neighbourhood, how much they
felt people in the neighbourhood looked out for one another, how
well they knew their neighbours, and the extent to which they felt
they have good friends locally (all answered on 7-point response
scales). In addition, people were asked to list all those individuals
they had contacted in the last two weeks for social reasons, and all
those individuals they could turn to if there was a problem. We
counted the number of individuals named (which was square-root
transformed for analysis) in both cases.
Naturalistic observations
Crime and antisocial behaviour: We also obtained data on all
incidents of crime and antisocial behaviour reported to North-
umbria police within each neighbourhood over the four months
December 2010 to March 2011 from the police database at www.
police.uk, classified by incident type. The remaining naturalistic
measures were drawn from 12 hours of direct behavioural
observation by a researcher on the streets of the each neighbour-
hoods, conducted between 19th April and 8th July 2010, one third
on the main streets and the remaining two thirds in the residential
streets (for details of sampling and recording, see Appendix S1).
The total number of adults observed over the 12 hours was similar
in the two neighbourhoods (Neighbourhood A: 4888, Neighbour-
hood B: 4750). We report the following measures. Littering: the
number of times we saw a person drop bottles, cans, paper,
cigarette ends or other trash onto the pavement. Police patrols: the
number of times a police patrol, either on foot or in a motor
vehicle, passed the researcher. Social group size: The number of
adults in each social group observed. Groups were defined on the
basis of moving or talking together.
Field experiments
Survey return rate: We tracked the proportion of surveys returned,
as this is itself a measure of willingness to cooperate with a request
for help. Our other field experiments were derived from the
previous social psychological literature on helping behaviour [17].
Lost letter. Following this well-established assay [26,34,35], a
stamped sealed letter addressed to the first author at Newcastle
Table 1. Key characteristics of the two study neighbourhoods.
Neighbourhood A Neighbourhood B
Total population (males) 3098 (1502) 3223 (1508)
Median age 37 34.5
Households 1250 1589
Population born in UK (%) 92 92
Index of Multiple Deprivation, score 8.74 76.43
Index of Multiple Deprivation, percentile of English neighbourhoods 79th 1st
Households owner-occupied 83% 18%
Residents in highest socioeconomic group of three-way classification (SEG-3) 74% 16%
Sources: 2001 UK census and 2004 Indices of Multiple Deprivation. IMD percentile is of all English census areas, where 1st represents the most deprived 1%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026922.t001
Variation in Cooperative Behaviour
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 October 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 10 | e26922
University medical school was left on the pavement on rain-free
mornings. Distances from a posting box were balanced across the
two neighbourhoods. The proportion of letters arriving is a
measure of strangers’ willingness to do an act of anonymous
kindness. Twenty-two letters were dropped in each neighbour-
hood. Dropped object: Research assistants (11 males, 13 females)
walked in each neighbourhood and dropped a small personal item
(e.g. keys, glove, pen) at 10 m from an oncoming lone pedestrian,
seeming not to notice. Type and business of street, as well as sex
and estimated age of target, were recorded. All research assistants
completed the same number of trials in each neighbourhood. The
target was classed as helping if he/she picked up the object or drew
the research assistant’s attention to it. Sixty objects were dropped
in each neighbourhood in total. Asking for directions: The same
research assistants approached a different target and asked for
directions to a hospital which lay approximately 1 km from the
study site. Targets were classified as helping if they gave detailed
instructions on how to go to the hospital. There were 30 trials in
each neighbourhood. Making change: The same research assistants
approached a different target and asked for help to make change
for a 50p or 20p coin. The target was classed as helping if they
checked in their wallets or pockets. There were 30 trials in each
neighbourhood.
Analysis
In what follows, we report non-parametric statistical tests where
assumptions of homogeneity of variance are violated, and
parametric tests otherwise. We report rate ratios (RR) for
frequencies of events in neighbourhood A versus B, and use
Fisher’s exact test (FET) to test for the significance of such
differences. We use Fisher’s combined probability test [36] to
assess whether the naturalistic observations and field experiments
as sets of tests of the null hypothesis of no neighbourhood
difference allow us to reject that hypothesis.
Results
Dictator Games
One hundred and eighteen people completed the DG (69
Neighbourhood A, 49 Neighbourhood B; 38 Unknown, 40 Friend,
40 Charity). The mean allocation to the other party was £3.81
(s.d. £4.64) of a possible £10. In a general linear model with
condition and neighbourhood as predictors, there were significant
effects of condition (F2,112 = 7.86, p,0.05, g
2 = 0.12), and
neighbourhood (F1,112 = 31.58, p,0.05, g
2 = 0.22; see figure 1).
The condition by neighbourhood interaction was not significant
(F2,112 = 0.19, n.s.). The condition effect was due to generosity
being significantly higher in Charity than in Unknown recipient
(Tukey test, mean difference 3.11, p,0.05) or Friend (Tukey test,
mean difference 3.30, p,0.05), though Unknown recipient and
Friend did not differ from one another (Tukey test, mean
difference 0.19, n.s.). The mean allocation across all conditions
was £5.55 (s.d. £4.74) in neighbourhood A and £1.35 (s.d. £3.15)
in neighbourhood B. Because the assumption of equality of
variances was violated, we also conducted non-parametric Mann-
Whitney U tests, which confirmed a significant difference between
the two neighbourhoods overall, and in each condition separately
(Overall: U= 927.5, z =24.70, p,0.05; Unknown recipient:
U= 93.5, z =23.0, p,0.05; Friend: U= 122.5, z =22.57,
p,0.05; Charity: U= 94.5, z =22.92, p,0.05).
Self-report survey
One hundred and twenty-four people completed the self-report
survey (74 Neighbourhood A, 50 Neighbourhood B). These
comprised the 118 completing the DG plus 6 who did not return
the payment form. The six social capital items were all significantly
positively correlated with one another (rs 0.20–0.70), and all six
showed a significant difference between the two neighbourhoods
(see Appendix S1). Here, we standardized all six and summed
Figure 1. Mean Dictator Game offers for the two neighbourhoods across the three different conditions. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026922.g001
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them to produce an overall social capital index, which had high
reliability (a=0.81). This index differed strongly between the two
neighbourhoods (Neighbourhood A: M 2.14, s.d. 3.11; Neigh-
bourhood B: M 23.21, s.d. 3.82; t121 =28.53, p,0.05; Cohen’s
d=1.54).
Overall,there was a significant positive correlation between
social capital and generosity in the DG (r116 = 0.40, p,0.05).
However, this was driven by the differences between the
neighbourhoods; the correlations between social capital and DG
allocation within each neighbourhood were weaker and not
significant (Neighbourhood A: r68 = 0.23, p = 0.06; Neighbour-
hood B: r48 = 0.13, n.s.). The lower social capital of neighbour-
hood B appeared to play a role in mediating the lower DG offers
observed there; when social capital was added as a covariate to a
General Linear Model predicting DG allocation from neighbour-
hood, both neighbourhood and social capital were significant
predictors (Neighbourhood: F1,113 = 8.45, p,0.05; Social capital:
F1,113 = 3.98, p,0.05), and the partial g
2 for neighbourhood
dropped from 0.20 to 0.07.
Naturalistic observations
Figure 2 summarizes the naturalistic observations. Crime and
antisocial behaviour: In neighbourhood A, there were 200 incidents
reported to the police during the study period, compared to 385 in
neighbourhood B (RR 0.52, FET against null hypothesis of equal
crime rates, p = 0.0001). The magnitude of the difference varied
with incident type, with violence and burglary showing the most
markedly higher incidences in neighbourhood B (see Appendix
S1). Littering: During the behavioural observation period, we
observed 4 incidences of littering in neighbourhood A and 25 in
neighbourhood B (RR 0.16, FET p= 0.005). Police patrols: We
observed 4 police patrols in 12 hours in neighbourhood A against
23 in neighbourhood B (RR 0.17, FET p= 0.009). Social group size:
We observed 3975 social groups containing adults in neighbour-
hood A and 3394 in neighbourhood B. Groups were significantly
smaller in neighbourhood A than B (Means 1.23 vs. 1.40; Mann-
Whitney U=6014708.5, p,0.05). In Appendix S1, we show that
this difference was reducible to a higher probability of adults being
on their own in neighbourhood A compared to neighbourhood B,
at all times of the day. This is despite the fact that the census tells
us that the number of adults per household is actually higher in
neighbourhood A than B (1.91 versus 1.52). As a set, the
naturalistic observations allowed us to reject the null hypothesis of
no difference between the neighbourhoods (Fisher’s combined
probability test, x2 = 52.25, d.f. = 8, p,0.05).
Field experiments
Figure 3 summarizes the results of the field experiments. Survey
return rates: Survey return rates were significantly different between
the two neighbourhoods (43.5% v. 21.7%; RR=2.00, FET
p= 0.001). Lost letter. Of a possible 22 letters, 20 were returned
from neighbourhood A and 7 from neighbourhood B (RR=2.86;
FET, p= 0.0001). Dropped object. Rates of helping were similar in
the two neighbourhoods (A, 38/60, B 36/60; RR=1.06; FET,
p= 0.85). Asking for directions. 22 of 30 targets helped in
neighbourhood A, compared to 20 in neighbourhood B
(RR=1.10, FET, p= 0.78). Making change. 15 of 30 targets helped
in neighbourhood A, compared to 12 in neighbourhood B
(RR=1.25, FET, p= 0.60). As a set, the field experiments allowed
us to reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the
neighbourhoods (Fisher’s combined probability test, x2 = 34.08,
d.f. = 10, p,0.05), albeit that this was driven entirely by the survey
return rates and lost letters.
Discussion
The introduction outlined three objectives of our study. The
first was to establish whether there was variation in DG behaviour
across our two matched neighbourhoods within the same city. The
results showed that there was, and that its magnitude was striking.
In neighbourhood A, 60% of individuals gave something to the
other party, whereas 6 kms away in neighbourhood B, only 20%
of individuals did. This was even true in the Friend condition,
where cooperation was made advantageous by doubling any
money given, and the participant could choose the beneficiary.
When the differences between the means observed for the two
neighbourhoods are expressed as percentages of the available
stake, they are substantially larger than the difference between a
US sample and a sample of Hadza hunter-gatherers observed in a
previous cross-cultural study (figure 4). With only two study
neighbourhoods, it is impossible to ascertain how widespread
discrepancies of this magnitude would be. However, in Appendix
S2, we report an ancillary study where self-reported social trust
was measured in almost 1,000 individuals in a further eight large
Tyneside neighbourhoods. Social trust is one of our social capital
variables, and, in the main study, correlates significantly with DG
allocations (r = 0.39, p,0.05). In the ancillary study, we show that
it varies substantially across the eight neighbourhoods, with 7% of
the variation in trust at the between-neighbourhood level, and a
continuum from high trust in the most affluent neighbourhoods to
low trust in the most deprived. This suggests that the pattern of
Figure 2. Summary of results from the four types of naturalistic observations across the two neighbourhoods. * significant difference
in frequency using Fisher’s exact test.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026922.g002
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variation in DG offers we have observed in the main study might
well generalize to the rest of the city.
In terms of the direction of the difference, it was the deprived
neighbourhood B where DG offers were low. This accords with
the findings of Falk and Zehnder in Zurich [12], but stands in
contrast to the findings of Piff et al. [22], who found that
individuals of lower socioeconomic position made more generous
allocations in a DG than those of higher socioeconomic position.
Our study population is different from that of Piff et al., and the
deprived areas of Newcastle have a specific social history (see
Appendix S1) which may not be shared by other places. There are
also a number of key methodological differences between the
studies. Piff et al.’s sample consisted of students at a major US
university, and so it is unlikely that their sample contained the very
wide range of socioeconomic positions our study reached. The
relationship between socioeconomic circumstances and DG
behaviour could well be non-linear. More importantly, in our
study, individuals knew that recipients would be others from the
deprived neighbourhood where they lived, whereas in the study of
Piff et al., recipients were students drawn from the university
community. These different set-ups are likely to produce different
results; our study assorts individuals from a deprived area with one
another, whilst theirs mixes individuals of different socioeconomic
positions at random. Finally, in the Piff et al. study, DG decisions
did not in fact have the exact financial consequences stated (i.e.
there was deceit), which may have become known within the
participant pool.
Our second objective was to explore the robustness of the DG
methodology, given past concerns about the effects of the
participant knowing that he or she is taking part in an experiment
[24,25], and the artificiality of dividing a resource with another
party without knowing who that party is [27]. We used a relatively
surreptitious administration, and, in the affluent neighbourhood A,
found a rate of generosity which is in line with previous studies
from affluent Western groups using a non-surreptitious adminis-
tration, suggesting that awareness of taking part in an experiment
is not prerequisite for generosity in the DG (cf. [26]). Moreover,
changing the recipient to be a friend named by the participant had
no significant effects on the level of generosity. Specifying the
recipient as a charitable good cause did significantly increase
giving. However, the relative difference between the two
neighbourhoods was the same in all conditions, suggesting that
as a community-level measure of cooperativeness, the DG is
relatively robust to variation in how the dilemma is specified.
Most importantly, our study allowed us to validate the DG
against other measures of cooperativeness at the community level.
Neighbourhoods A and B differed markedly in DG offers, and
they also differed in a whole suite of other ways (summarised in
table 2) that can relate to the readiness of people there to
cooperate with one another. The social capital of residents of
neighbourhood A was much higher than that of neighbourhood B,
and the social capital difference partially statistically mediated the
difference in DG allocation between the two sites. Importantly for
the validity of both the DG and the social capital survey as
community-level measures, we found that in the neighbourhood
where DG offers and social capital were relatively low, crime and
antisocial behaviour were relatively frequent, especially violent
crime and burglary, individuals were more likely to drop their
litter on the street, and the police, no doubt aware of these
differences, patrolled more heavily. Furthermore, in that neigh-
bourhood, people were less likely to respond to a survey requesting
their participation, and less likely to pick up a lost letter and see
that it was mailed. Thus, these results all suggest that if one
community is typified by lower DG offers and self-reported social
capital than another, this does mean that everyday cooperation
Figure 3. Summary of results from the five types of field experiment across the two neighbourhoods. * significant difference in
frequency using Fisher’s exact test.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026922.g003
Figure 4. The difference, as a percentage of the available stake,
between the mean DG allocation observed in a US sample and
a sample of Hadza hunter-gatherers (white bar, from reference
[2]), and between our neighbourhoods A and B for the three
conditions of this study (grey bars).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026922.g004
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between members of that community is less widespread or
forthcoming.
Some of our field experiments, namely dropped objects, asking
for change and asking for directions, showed no significant
difference between neighbourhoods. We had no prior expectation
that this would be the case. We note that the experiments which
show no difference involve face to face interaction, whereas survey
return and lost letter do not. In effect, in the survey response and
dropped letter, the participant can decide not to get involved in an
interaction with a stranger at all, whereas in the asking for
directions and asking for change, he or she is unavoidably involved
by virtue of the fact that the experimenter has approached. Thus,
it would make sense for there to be neighbourhood differences in
the former set of tasks, but not necessarily the latter, if people in
neighbourhood B are following a policy of avoiding initiating
avoidable social interactions with people they do not know well.
Previous studies using similar methods have also found that
different types of helping do not all pattern together at the
community level, and not all show a relationship with economic
conditions [17]. Greater understanding the different types of
helping, and how each relates to different aspects of the social
context, is still needed (see [37]).
One measure showed a pattern somewhat contrary to the
others, namely social group size. In the deprived neighbourhood
B, where people named fewer others they could turn to in time of
need, and where they were less likely to allocate any money to a
friend in the DG, they were nonetheless more likely to be with
someone else when moving around the neighbourhood. This was
not because they were more likely to live with someone else, since
there are in fact more lone-adult households in neighbourhood B
than in A. One interpretation of this difference would be that in
neighbourhood B, social ties are either strong (a few ties per
individual), or completely absent, whereas in neighbourhood A,
individuals have a greater range of weak ties which foster overall
trust and community cohesion. This argument is in line with
Granovetter’s classic analysis of why working class-communities in
Boston’s West End failed to take collective action, despite
containing strong individual friendships [38]. Admittedly, it would
not explain the reluctance of residents in neighbourhood B to
cooperate in the Friend condition of the DG, where only one
friend needs to be named.
The interpretation of some of the differences listed in table 2 is
debatable. For example, the £10 stake may be worth more to
residents of neighbourhood B, where incomes are lower. However,
previous research with the DG has found that the stake can be
doubled [6], or even increased by an order of magnitude [39],
with no significant effect on the pattern of allocation. Thus, it
seems unlikely that the neighbourhood difference could be
explained away by differences in the value of £10. It is also
possible that the participants from neighbourhood B either
understood the paradigm less well or trusted the researchers less
to deliver the money than those of neighbourhood A. However,
participants allocating everything to themselves had to indicate an
active choice to do so, and it is unclear why lack of trust of the
researchers – which would itself be a relevant finding, and is
suggested by the lower survey return rate - should lead to a greater
allocation to self rather than the other party. If you don’t believe
the researchers are likely to deliver, why not give all the money
away, or simply not return the payment form?
Although the exact meaning of any individual measure may be
equivocal so many different measures taken together do begin to
reveal something of a pattern, and suggest that people’s social
experience and relations within these two nearby neighbourhoods
are profoundly different. We feel these results are important both
practically and theoretically. Practically, they confirm using a
novel suite of methods that some socioeconomically deprived
communities can fall into an equilibrium of low trust and low
social investment. Such a situation affects people’s quality of life,
undermines civic and regeneration efforts [40], and allows
disorder to flourish [15]. Experimental dilemmas such as the
DG may have a role, as an alternative to traditional self-report
surveys, as barometric measures for community-level social
cohesion and connectedness, in attempts to understand and
mitigate these dynamics.
Theoretically, our study adds to our growing understanding of
the phenotypic variability in human cooperation. The results
conform with those from recent studies of non-industrial
populations showing that the within-population variation in
cooperative behaviour can be just as marked and substantial as
the between-population variation [9]. In particular, the claim that
there is little within-country variation in prosocial behaviour in
industrial societies ([8], p. 604) can clearly not be upheld, and may
Table 2. Summary of the measures used and the results observed.
Measure type Measure Result
Experimental economic dilemma DG People in A give more than people in B, regardless of identity of recipient
Self-report Social capital All measures of social capital higher in A than B
Naturalistic observations Crime and antisocial behaviour Around half as many incidents reported to police in A compared to B; violence and
burglary especially rarer
Littering People much less likely to drop litter in A compared to B
Police patrols Police patrol A at much lower frequency than B
Social group size Adults in the streets are more likely to be alone in A than adults in B
Field experiments Survey return rates People in A more likely to respond to a request to participate in a survey
Lost letter People in A more likely to mail in a stamped letter left on pavement
Dropped object No difference between A and B in likelihood of helping a stranger who has seemingly
dropped something
Asking for directions No difference between A and B in likelihood of helping a stranger who needs to find the
hospital
Making change No difference between A and B in helping a stranger who needs to make change for a coin
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026922.t002
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be an artefact of restricted participant pools. The results also
suggest new avenues of investigation in terms of the causes of intra-
community variation in cooperative behaviour. Existing approach-
es tend to invoke stable, societal-level culturally-transmitted norms
[1]. However, our two study neighbourhoods are part of the same
society, and their residents share the same broad cultural heritage.
Yet, their DG behaviour is as divergent as any two groups yet
studied. Thus, determinants operating at a more local level must
be invoked. There are important differences between the
neighbourhoods in terms of ecology and demography, and it
may be that the differences in cooperative behaviour represent
immediate evoked responses to these. In neighbourhood B,
resources are scarce, and mortality and morbidity are high [19].
Many people are in poor health and material states, and their
temporal discount rates and risk preferences will be likely to differ
from those of their affluent neighbours. All of these factors should
be expected to affect decisions about social investment. As for
demographic processes, recent theoretical models have shown that
the ability of individuals to leave locations where cooperation is
low has a powerful influence on its stability [41,42]. Neighbour-
hood A is inhabited by affluent owner-occupiers who have the
resources to simply move away if local social behaviour is not to
their taste. Neighbourhood B has experienced decades of selective
outmigration by people with the means to do so, and its population
has declined substantially (see Appendix S1). The remaining
residents are largely those who have no means to exert any
location choice. They thus have no real option but to find ways of
accommodating to the locally prevailing patterns, which they may
do by not initiating avoidable social encounters. This would
entrench the pattern of low trust and small social networks which
we observed.
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